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I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly ninety years, Major League Baseball ("MLB") has en-
joyed the unique status of being the only professional sports league
operating under a judicial exemption from federal antitrust law.
MLB's antitrust exemption dates back to the United States Supreme
Court's 1922 landmark opinion in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,1 in which the
Court held that because baseball games were "purely state affairs,"2
federal antitrust law-which governs only interstate commerce-did
not apply to the business of baseball. 3 Despite the dubious nature of
this holding,4 the Court subsequently reaffirmed Federal Baseball on
two separate occasions. 5
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, D.C.; J.D. 2005, University of
Michigan Law School; B.S. 2002, Ohio University, Honors Tutorial College.
1. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
2. Id. at 208.
3. Id.
4. Many commentators have criticized the logic of the Court's Federal Baseball
opinion. See, e.g., Salerno v. Am. League of Profl Baseball, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005
(2d Cir. 1970) ("We freely acknowledge our belief that Federal Baseball was not
one of Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days. . . ."); ROGER I. ABRAMs, LEGAL BASES:
BASEBALL AND THE LAW 45-69 (Temple Univ. Press 1998) (quoting same); H.
Ward Classen, Three Srikes and You're Out: An Investigation of Professional
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REV. 369, 376 (1988) (reporting that
Federal Baseball has been "widely criticized"); Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis Cole-
man, Early Baseball Law, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 117 n.2 (2001) (finding the
opinion had been "much-criticized").
5. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
For a greater discussion of the exemption, see infra note 12.
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For its part, Congress waited nearly eight decades before finally
addressing MLB's longstanding antitrust exemption for the first time
by passing the Curt Flood Act of 1998 ("CFA" or "Act").6 Members of
Congress boasted that the CFA was landmark legislation "bringing
the rule of antitrust law to baseball."7 In reality, however, the Act
was much less sweeping, simply lifting MLB's antitrust exemption in
a single, limited respect. Specifically, the CFA allowed MLB players
to file antitrust lawsuits "directly relating to or affecting employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league
level" against the league.8 In other words, under the CFA only cur-
rent MLB players have standing to bring an antitrust suit against the
league, and then only so long as the players assert antitrust claims
directly related to the terms or conditions of their employment-as
opposed to antitrust suits involving issues affecting the minor leagues,
broadcasting, franchise ownership, expansion, or relocation. 9 Thus,
the CFA left MLB's exemption intact in all respects, aside from suits
affecting the employment of players at the major league level brought
by current players themselves.
Before the CFA, MLB's antitrust exemption had prevented players
from bringing antitrust suits against the league, even when MLB
owners engaged in anticompetitive conduct, or negotiated with the
players in bad faith.10 MLB's antitrust exemption thus placed base-
ball players on unequal footing in comparison to athletes in other pro-
fessional sports leagues;" because none of the other leagues enjoy an
exemption from federal antitrust law, professional athletes in other
sports have always been able to assert antitrust claims against their
respective leagues during labor disputes. The CFA corrected this ine-
quality, granting MLB players the same right enjoyed by athletes in
the other professional sports leagues.
With MLB's antitrust exemption having long been a popular sub-
ject of legal scholarship,' 2 and because the CFA marked Congress'
6. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006).
7. Reynolds Holding, Do Baseball Bigwigs Deserve Special Treatment? Why, Ex-
actly, Should Those Who Already Have it Easy be Further Protected by a Monop-
oly?, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 22, 1998, at 5.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (2006).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
11. E.g., the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), National Football League
("NFL"), and National Hockey League ("NHL").
12. See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 4; Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamina-
tion of Professional Baseball's Antitrust Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U.
Pirr. L. REV. 209 (1983); M. Lindsey Cowen, Baseball and the Law-Yesterday
and Today, 32 VA. L. REV. 1164 (1946); John Eckler, Baseball-Sport or Com-
merce?, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 56 (1949); Mitchell Nathanson, The Irrelevance of
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2005); Morgen A. Sullivan,
"A Derelict in the Stream of Law": Overruling Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 48
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first legislative foray into the field, the Act quickly generated substan-
tial scholarly consideration. 13 These commentators almost unani-
mously concluded that the CFA accomplished "virtually nothing,"14
would have "no practical effect" on the game,15 and ultimately had
only "symbolic value."16 This skepticism was based on the United
States Supreme Court's 1996 opinion in Brown v. Pro Football Inc.,17
in which the Court held that the so-called "nonstatutory labor exemp-
DuKE L.J. 1265 (1999); Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball
Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576 (1953); Comment, Organized Baseball
and the Law, 46 YALE L.J. 1386 (1937).
13. The Marquette Sports Law Journal devoted a symposium to the legislation, pub-
lishing a total of eight perspectives on the CFA. See Roger I. Abrams, Before the
Flood: The History of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 307
(1999); Ted Curtis, The Flood Act's Place in Baseball Legal History, 9 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 403 (1999); Edmund P. Edmonds, The Curt Flood Act of 1998: A
Hollow Gesture After All These Years?, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 315 (1999); J. Gordon
Hylton, Why Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Still Survives, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J.
391 (1999); Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Ali to Flood to Marshall: The Most Trium-
phant of Words, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 439 (1999); Marianne McGettigan, The Curt
Flood Act of 1998: The Players' Perspective, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 379 (1999); Gary
R. Roberts, A Brief Appraisal of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 From the Minor
League Perspective, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 413 (1999); John T. Wolohan, The Curt
Flood Act of 1998 and Major League Baseball's Federal Antitrust Exemption, 9
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 347 (1999).
In addition to this symposium, the CFA was also separately considered by a
number of other commentators. See, e.g., Philip R. Bautista, Congress Says,
"Yooou're Out!!!" to the Antitrust Exemption of Professional Baseball: A Discus-
sion of the Current State of Player-Owner Collective Bargaining and the Impact of
the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 445 (2000); J. Philip
Calabrese, Antitrust and Baseball, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 531 (1999); Charles Al-
len Criswell, Jr., Repeal of Baseball's Longstanding Antitrust Exemption: Did
Congress Strike Out Again?, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 545 (1999); Jennifer Dyer, The
Curt Flood Act of 1998: After 76 Years, Congress Lifts Baseball's Antitrust Exemp-
tion on Labor Relations But Leaves Franchise Relocation Up to the Courts, 3 T.M.
COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 247 (2000); Joshua P. Jones, A Congressional
Swing and Miss: The Curt Flood Act, Player Control, and the National Pastime,
33 GA. L. REV. 639 (1999); Peter M. Macaluso, Bang the Gavel Slowly: A Call for
Judicial Activism Following the Curt Flood Act, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 463 (2000).
14. Roberts, supra note 13, at 432; see also Macaluso, supra note 13, at 480 (stating
the CFA "accomplishes little"); Sullivan, supra note 13, at 1266 (determining the
CFA had a "limited" impact).
15. Hylton, supra note 13, at 391; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at 312 (finding the
Act "would not change one iota of the relationship between the major league club
owners and the major league players"); Wolohan, supra note 13, at 375-76 (con-
cluding the CFA will have "very little" impact on negotiations between MLB and
the players union). But see McGettigan, supra note 13, at 379 (arguing that the
CFA "should reduce the likelihood of work stoppages" in MLB).
16. Calabrese, supra note 13, at 531; see also BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE:
CURT FLOOD'S FIGHT FOR FREE AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 349 (Viking
2006) (finding the CFA was "a posthumous but hollow victory" for the legisla-
tion's namesake, Curt Flood); Abrams, supra note 13, at 312; Mathewson, supra
note 13, at 439 ("I find the Act only a symbolic tribute.").
17. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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tion" prevented unionized NFL players from asserting an antitrust
suit against the league, even during impasses in the players' union's
negotiations with the NFL.18 The nonstatutory labor exemption pro-
vides that collective bargaining agreements are exempt from antitrust
law to the extent they affect "mandatory subjects" of collective bar-
gaining (i.e., wages, hours, and certain other terms and conditions of
employment).' 9 Because Brown prevents unionized players from fil-
ing antitrust actions relating to many of the most common subjects of
collective bargaining, players generally must now disband or "decer-
tify" their union in order to pursue such antitrust suits.
Therefore, although the CFA permits players to file antitrust law-
suits against MLB, under Brown, MLB players must generally first
decertify their union-the Major League Baseball Players Association
("MLBPA")-in order for such a suit to succeed. 20 Otherwise, the suit
would quickly be dismissed pursuant to Brown and the nonstatutory
labor exemption.
Commentators were skeptical of the efficacy of the CFA largely be-
cause they did not believe MLB players would ever decertify the
MLBPA.21 Union decertification is a "costly process" for the players,
requiring that the players forgo union benefits such as agent certifica-
tion and union-managed pension and disability plans.2 2 Players
would also risk losing the benefits they had obtained in previous col-
lective bargaining agreements. 2 3 Therefore, in light of Brown, the
common consensus at the time of the CFA's passage was that the Act
18. Id.; see also Wolohan, supra note 13, at 376.
19. See, e.g., Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1045 (1994); Lee
Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to Employers'
Labor Market Restraints in Sports and Non-Sports Market, 3 UTAH L. REV. 617,
650-53 (1989); Abraham Spira, Almost Three Decades Later, Is Mackey Still Via-
ble?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 805, 811-13 (2007); Com-
ment, Antitrust Law-Nonstatutory Labor Exemption-Second Circuit Exempts
NFL Eligibility Rules from Antitrust Scrutiny-Clarett v. National Football
League, 118 HIAv. L. REV. 1379 (2005); Shawn Treadwell, Note, An Examination
of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption From the Antitrust Laws, in the Context of
Professional Sports, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 962 (1996).
20. See, e.g., Bautista, supra note 13, at 478; Roberts, supra note 13, at 433. While
the nonstatutory labor exemption does not apply to negotiations over so-called
"non-mandatory subjects" of collective bargaining, due to the extensive history of
labor negotiations between MLB and the MLBPA, it is unlikely that the players
could persuasively assert that a grievance relates to a non-mandatory subject.
Bautista, supra note 13, at 476-78.
21. Bautista, supra note 13, at 478; Edmonds, supra note 13, at 341; Lacie L. Kaiser,
Revisiting the Impact of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 on the Bargaining Relation-
ship Between Players and Management in Major League Baseball, 1 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 230, 250 (2004); Roberts, supra note 13, at 433.
22. Roberts, supra note 13, at 433.
23. Edmonds, supra note 13, at 341.
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would have little impact on baseball, or upon negotiations between
MLB and the MLBPA.
Upon reflection eleven years later, however, the initial skepticism
of these commentators appears to have been misplaced. The enact-
ment of the CFA has directly coincided with-and indeed helped to
usher in-MLB's longest sustained period of labor peace in nearly
forty years. While it is, of course, difficult for outsiders to the negotia-
tions between MLB and the MLBPA to ascertain the precise impact of
the CFA, the CFA's effect upon labor relations between players and
owners is nevertheless apparent. The passage of the CFA has caused
MLB owners to moderate their bargaining positions, resulting in more
harmonious labor negotiations with the MLBPA.
This Essay reconsiders the CFA's unexpected impact by first
briefly reviewing the Act, and then examining how the CFA has
changed the tenor of labor negotiations between MLB owners and the
MLBPA. The Essay concludes that despite the general skepticism at
the time of its passage, the CFA has nevertheless helped foster base-
ball's recent, unprecedented labor peace.
II. THE CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998
The CFA originated through a compromise between MLB owners
and the MLBPA, as part of the 1996 collective bargaining agree-
ment. 2 4 In that agreement, both MLB and the MLBPA agreed to
lobby Congress to pass legislation granting players a limited right to
file an antitrust suit against the league.2 5 The MLBPA sought this
legislation in order to place MLB players on equal footing with players
in the other professional sports leagues, who have always enjoyed the
right to pursue antitrust suits against their leagues. 26 Meanwhile,
MLB was willing to give its players the ability to file an antitrust suit
because it believed that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown had
substantially minimized the value of the right.27 The joint lobbying
efforts were ultimately successful, resulting in Congress's passage of
the CFA in 1998. The Act was named in honor of former MLB player
Curt Flood-the named petitioner in the Supreme Court's most recent
reaffirmance of MLB's antitrust exemption, Flood v. Kuhn28-who
sacrificed his playing career to challenge MLB's antitrust exemption
in the early 1970s. 29
24. Jones, supra note 13, at 662 (quoting agreement).
25. Id.; see also Macaluso, supra note 13, at 476.
26. Gregg Krupa, Action Suits Players-Baseball Union Gets Boost From Senate,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 1998, at D6, available at 1998 WLNR 2376277 (quoting
chief MLBPA outside counsel Stephen Fehr).
27. See Abrams, supra note 13, at 312.
28. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
29. See generally SNYDER, supra note 16.
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Specifically, the CFA added a new provision to the Clayton Act of
1914,30 applying only to MLB players. 3 1 Section A allows MLB play-
ers to bring antitrust suits against the league "to the same extent such
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the anti-
trust laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports
business ... ."32 Section B contains a number of express limitations to
the Act, stipulating that the CFA does not apply to litigation involving
either amateur or minor league players, nor to lawsuits arising out of
disputes involving "franchise expansion, location or relocation, [or]
franchise ownership issues, including ownership transfers . ... "33
Section C further restricts the CFA's reach, limiting standing under
the Act only to current or former major league baseball players. 34 Not
only is this final provision largely redundant, but it also "creates con-
fusion because the Act does not create a cause of action to sue."3 5
Therefore, despite the initial proclamations by politicians boasting
that the CFA profoundly limited MLB's antitrust exemption,36 in real-
ity the Act's reach was much more limited.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE CFA
In light of the CFA's limited scope, commentators' predictions that
the Act would be largely impotent were understandable. In fact, such
predictions have proven correct in at least two respects: no MLB
player has ever filed suit under the CFA,37 nor have MLB players sub-
sequently attempted to decertify their union. However, the common
consensus that the CFA would have no practical effect on the game
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006). The Clayton Act supplemented the Sherman Anti-
trust Act of 1890 by prohibiting particular types of anticompetitive conduct, in-
cluding mergers and acquisitions which may substantially lessen competition, 15
U.S.C. § 18, and price discrimination. 15 U.S.C. § 13.
31. Wolohan, supra note 13, at 367.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006).
33. Id.; see also Criswell, supra note 13, at 547 (noting that "the bill makes no at-
tempt to repeal baseball's exemption as it applies to franchise relocation").
34. 15 U.S.C. § 26b.
35. Roberts, supra note 13, at 427.
36. See Holding, supra note 7, at 5.
37. In fact, only three courts have ever even cited the CFA. Two of these courts cited
the Act as part of their consideration of MLB's antitrust exemption, in litigation
unrelated to collective bargaining between the league and the MLBPA. Major
League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1331 n.16 (N.D. Fla.
2001); Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 n.12 (M.D.
Fla. 1999). The only other court to cite the CFA was the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon in Johnson v. Harper/Collins, No. 06-3036-AA,
2006 WL 2225814 (D. Or. July 31, 2006). In Johnson, a pro se plaintiff alleged
that the defendant publishing company had violated federal copyright and "'Ma-
jor League Baseball' antitrust laws" by using his likeness without permission. Id.
at *1. The court properly found that the plaintiff-who had never been an MLB
player-lacked standing to bring an antitrust claim under the CFA. Id.
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has proven erroneous in one significant respect: the CFA helped to
usher in MLB's longest period of sustained labor peace in nearly four
decades.
Between 1972 and 1996, MLB and the MLBPA negotiated five sep-
arate collective bargaining agreements; each negotiation was highly
contentious, resulting in eight separate work stoppages during the
course of the five negotiations. 38 Since the passage of the CFA, how-
ever, MLB has gone more than a decade without a strike or lockout.
During this time, MLB owners and the MLBPA have negotiated two
separate collective bargaining agreements, 3 9 each without incident.
Thus, after averaging one work stoppage less than every three years
from 1972 to 1996, MLB has not experienced a single strike or lockout
in the eleven years since CFA's passage.
MLB owners have helped facilitate this sustained labor peace by
fostering a more cooperative atmosphere in negotiations with the
MLBPA by moderating their negotiating positions on critical issues.
For instance, in the three negotiations prior to the enactment of the
CFA, MLB owners consistently pressed the MLBPA to adopt a salary
cap limiting the total number of dollars that an individual team could
spend on its players' salaries,4O an issue that the MLBPA has long
considered a non-starter. In fact, during the midst of the 1994 players'
strike, MLB owners attempted to unilaterally impose a salary cap on
players during an impasse in negotiations, only to have the National
Labor Relations Board strike the plan down.41
Many in the industry suspected that the owners would seek to re-
visit the possibility of a salary cap in the negotiations that led to the
2002 collective bargaining agreement. 42 However, the owners ulti-
38. Bautista, supra note 13, at 456-66; Calabrese, supra note 13, at 540. For a his-
tory of the eight work stoppages, see Matthew Ryan McCarthy, Revenue Sharing
in Major League Baseball: Are Cuba's Political Managers on Their Way Over
Too?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PaAc. 555, 558-60 (2005).
39. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2007-2011 BAsic AGREEMENT (2006), http://mlb-
players.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf (last visited November 1, 2008); MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2003-2006 BAsic AGREEMENT (2002), http://www.bizofbase
ball.com/docs/2002_2006basicagreement.pdf (last visited November 1, 2008).
40. McCarthy, supra note 38, at 559-60 (noting that the owners had sought a salary
cap during the 1985, 1990, and 1994 negotiations with the MLBPA).
41. See Kaiser, supra note 21, at 258 n.160 (citing Paul D. Staudohar, The Baseball
Strike of 1994-95, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1997, at 21, available at http://www.
bls.gov/opub/mlr/1997/03/art4full.pdf).
42. See Eric Fisher, Single-entity Leagues Receive Validation From Federal Court,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WLNR 344407 (reporting
the owners' "ultimate goal of a salary cap remains elusive"); Ronald Blum, Base-
ball Suffers From Brownout, VERO BEACH PRESS J. (Florida), Jan. 24, 1999, at B7,
available at 1999 WLNR 6160905 ("Even though the next round of collective bar-
gaining likely won't begin until after the 2001 season, salary cap talk filled the
air.").
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mately chose not to seek a salary cap in the 2002 negotiations,4 3 the
first time they had not pursued a cap in over two decades. Moreover,
the owners also pledged not to unilaterally impose any labor provi-
sions upon players, 4 4 a notable departure from their course of conduct
in prior negotiations. Similarly, during the negotiations leading to the
2006 collective bargaining agreement, the owners once again elected
not to seek a salary cap, resulting in unprecedentedly harmonious ne-
gotiations, 45 and causing chief MLBPA negotiator Donald Fehr to
marvel at the ease with which the union was able to work with
ownership. 46
This moderation in the MLB owners' negotiating position can be
attributed, at least in part, to the CFA. Specifically, by giving players
the legal right to bring an antitrust suit-and accordingly the ability
to seek treble damages-the CFA has forced MLB owners to approach
their negotiations with the MLBPA more cautiously. Although the
threat is slim that MLB players will actually file an antitrust suit-
after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown47-it is nevertheless a
threat that did not exist prior to the enactment of the CFA. While
MLB players must first decertify their union before suing ownership,
the threat of decertification can nevertheless serve as a real and pow-
erful weapon. 48 For instance, NFL players have successfully decerti-
fled their union in order to obtain bargaining concessions from league
owners. 49 Meanwhile, the threat of decertification in the NBA caused
league owners to publicly threaten players with a prolonged lockout
43. Eric Fisher, Will Baseball Strike Out Again?, 18 INSIGHT ON NEWS 30, Apr. 29,
2002), available at 2002 WLNR 5078223 (reporting that owners were seeking to
modify the terms of the prior agreement's revenue sharing and luxury tax sys-
tems, rather than seek a salary cap).
44. Andrew Zimbalist, All Right All You Lawyers, Play Ball!, Bus. WK., April 15,
2002, at 108, available at 2002 WLNR 7756445.
45. ESPN.com, MLB players, owners announce five-year labor deal, Oct. 25, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2637615 (last visited November 3,
2008) (noting that MLB owners did not campaign against the players publicly
during the 2006 negotiations, a common ownership tactic in previous
negotiations).
46. Id. ("'I'd been waiting for most of that time to see if we could ever get to the place
where we reached an agreement prior to expiration,' said union head Donald
Fehr, whose first negotiations as union chief was in 1985. 'And while I always
understood intellectually it was possible and that was the goal, I'm not really
sure I believed that it could happen."').
47. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
48. See McGettigan, supra note 13, at 380 ("the mere prospect of [an antitrust] chal-
lenge can serve to moderate the actions of employers and the content of their
bargaining proposals").
49. Through decertification, NFL players obtained the right to free agency after pre-
vailing at trial against the league in McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F.
Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992); see also Dyer, supra note 13, at 270 (noting that decer-
tification of the NFL Players Association eventually resulted in concessions by
NFL owners); Mathew Levine, Despite His Antics, T.O. Has a Valid Point: Why
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during a 1995 labor dispute.50 Thus, the threat of decertification, and
with it an antitrust suit by the players, presents a credible risk to
league owners.5 1 Indeed, Steven Fehr-the MLBPA's chief outside
counsel who was involved in both the 2002 and 2006 negotiations, as
well as the lobbying efforts leading to the enactment of the CFA-
believes that the CFA has had an "atmospheric" effect on the union's
negotiations with MLB owners. 52
Moreover, the fact that the MLBPA required MLB owners to agree
to help lobby Congress to pass the CFA is also instructive. 5 3 The
MLBPA-the shrewdest and most successful players' union of the four
major professional sports leagues 54-is unlikely to have pursued an
ineffective legislative initiative. The union was well aware of the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Brown when it sought the enactment of the
CFA,55 and would not have pursued the Act unless it believed the
CFA would impact the tenor of its negotiations with the owners. 56
Along these lines, Donald Fehr stated at the time of the CFA's passage
that the Act would "'be a significant step toward minimizing the labor
discord and disruptions in play that have plagued our national pas-
time,"'57 and would create "'an important opportunity to forge a new
and better relationship between major league owners and players."' 58
Fehr would later note that "'[there is now no doubt that players will
NFL Players Deserve A Bigger Piece of the Pie, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 425,
448-49 (2006).
50. Jeffrey L. Kessler & David G. Feher, What Justice Breyer Could Not Know at His
Mother's Knee: The Adverse Effects of Brown v. Pro Football on Labor Relations in
Professional Sports, ANTITRUST, Spring 2000, at 41, 43.
51. See Zimbalist, supra note 44, at 108 (finding with respect to the 2002 negotiations
that MLB "players, rather than striking as in 1994, are likely to take a decidedly
different tack, too: decertify their union and sue the owners on antitrust
grounds.").
52. Telephone Interview with Steven Fehr, Primary Outside Counsel, Major League
Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA") (April 17, 2008).
53. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
54. See.Levine, supra note 49, at 437 (finding that the MLBPA is "one of the strong-
est labor unions in the country"); Ross Newhan, Selig and Fehr Are No Fools on
the Hill, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 772295 ("At a time
when unions are being devastated by corporations and conglomerates, the Major
League Baseball Players Association remains among the nation's strongest.").
55. Mathewson, supra note 13, at 443; see also Thomas J. Ostertag, Baseball's Anti-
trust Exemption: Its History and Continuing Importance, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 54, 65-66 (2004) (confirming that the owners and players were both aware of
Brown when they agreed to lobby Congress).
56. See Mathewson, supra note 13, at 443 ("Surely [the MLBPA] did not use the col-
lective bargaining process to obtain a bargaining tool without some strategy as to
how it would use the Act in the future.").
57. Murray Chass, Baseball: Deal Struck on Antitrust Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998,
at C3, available at 1998 WLNR 2976074.
58. Editorial, Bringing Baseball Back, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at C2, available
at 1998 WLNR 385825.
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be able to consider antitrust litigation as an option in any future dis-
pute"' with MLB.59 Even MLB commissioner Bud Selig believed the
CFA would improve the sport's labor relations, stating, "'We are hope-
ful that this legislation will bring to an end the sort of acrimony that
led to eight work stoppages over the past three decades."' 60
Skeptics of the CFA will likely dismiss the Act's impact on labor
relations between MLB and the MLBPA, and instead argue that the
league's sustained labor peace is the result of other factors, such as
the tremendous financial success enjoyed by both MLB owners and
players in recent years, or the belief that baseball could not afford an-
other damaging work stoppage after the disastrous 1994 players'
strike.6 1 While both of these factors have undoubtedly contributed at
some level to MLB's current labor peace, neither factor fully explains
the dramatic shift in labor relations between MLB and the MLBPA
since the passage of the CFA.
First, while MLB has certainly experienced great financial success
in recent years, this factor alone cannot explain the sport's sustained
labor peace. For example, the 1994 strike came on the heels of one of
MLB's most successful seasons ever, during which the sport generated
record attendance figures.6 2 Moreover, the 2002 collective bargaining
agreement was reached during a period in which MLB purported to be
in the midst of significant financial struggles. The 2002 agreement
was negotiated in the aftermath of the MLB-commissioned "Blue Rib-
bon Report," issued in July 2000, which found that only three of the
thirty MLB teams had operated profitably over the previous five
years,6 3 Therefore, baseball's current and unprecedented period of
peaceful labor relations cannot simply be attributed to MLB's current
profitability, as the league's recent labor history shows both that MLB
has (i) experienced a labor stoppage during a period of great financial
success, and (ii) negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement
without incident during a period of alleged financial turmoil.
59. Antitrust Exemption Removed From Baseball Labor Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
1998, at D7.
60. Bringing Baseball Back, supra note 58, at C2.
61. See Kaiser, supra note 21, at 259 (suggesting that MLB and the MLBPA believed
"they could not upset society's view of baseball by having yet another strike or
lockout"). The 1994 strike resulted in the first cancellation of the annual World
Series championship in ninety years, and was estimated to have cost the owners
over $700 million in revenue, and players over $243 million in lost wages. Bau-
tista, supra note 13, at 466.
62. Harry Rosenthal, Census Book Portrays U.S. By the Numbers, CAPITAL TIMES
(Wisconsin), Nov. 1, 1995, at 11A (reporting that MLB set a then-record attend-
ance figure of 71 million fans in 1993).
63. RICHARD C. LEVIN, ET AL., MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, THE REPORT OF THE INDEPEN-
DENT MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSIONER'S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON BASEBALL Eco-
NOMICS 12, (2000), http://www.mlb.conmlb/downloads/blue-ribbon.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2008).
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Baseball's current labor relations also cannot be explained simply
by virtue of the fact that the owners and players may be hesitant to
experience another extended work stoppage after the disastrous 1994
strike. Notably, some of the same commentators who suggested
shortly after the CFA's passage that the legislation would not have an
impact on labor relations, also predicted that the league would con-
tinue to experience labor strife in the future.6 4 Despite such dire pre-
dictions, MLB owners and the MLBPA have twice negotiated new
collective bargaining agreements without acrimony since the passage
of the CFA, in 2002 and 2006.65 Of these, the 2002 agreement is par-
ticularly noteworthy. That agreement marked the first labor agree-
ment reached by MLB and the MLBPA in thirty years without a work
stoppage, 66 despite the fact that heading into the negotiations, many
industry insiders were predicting that another stoppage was immi-
nent due to the contentious issues at stake.67
The 2006 agreement between the owners and players was also
reached with remarkable ease.68 That agreement is notable insofar as
it came several months prior to the expiration of the 2002 agree-
ment-an unprecedented accomplishment for baseball.6 9 Indeed, the
announcement of the agreement came as a surprise to many because
it had largely been negotiated out of the public eye. 7o Thus, despite
dire predictions at the time of the CFA's passage that the Act would do
nothing to prevent continued labor strife, MLB owners and the
MLBPA have nevertheless concluded two subsequent collective bar-
gaining agreements after surprisingly peaceful negotiations. Accord-
ingly, any suggestion that baseball's current labor peace is solely the
64. Bautista, supra note 13, at 478 (predicting "in all probability... [an] impasse
during the next negotiations"); Calabrese, supra note 13, at 544 ("The threat of
renewed labor unrest has undermined the goodwill that resulted from owner-
player cooperation in lobbying for passage of the Act."); Edmonds, supra note 13,
at 342 ("the prospect of labor peace in [MLB] has not been significantly advanced
by the passage of the [CFA]"); Jones, supra note 13, at 690 ("As the specter of yet
another work stoppage rears its ugly head with the current collective bargaining
agreement's expiration in 2001, Congress, with the Flood Act, took a noble, yet
ineffective, shot at bridging the gap in labor relations . ..").
65. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2007-2011 BASIc AGREEMENT (2006), http://mlb-
players.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf (last visited November 1, 2008); MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2003-2006 BASIC AGREEMENT (2002), http://www.bizofbase
ball.com/docs/2002_2006basicagreement.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
66. See McCarthy, supra note 38, at 559-60 (reporting history).
67. See Calabrese, supra note 13, at 544 n.96 (citing articles discussing players' ex-
pectations of a stoppage, and the owners' plans to seek a salary cap); Chris Jen-
kins, Baseball's Collective Head in Sand? Labor War Looms in 2002; Few Players
Seem to Care, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (California), Apr. 1, 2002, at C1, available
at 2001 WLNR 12005079.
68. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
69. ESPN.com, supra note 45.
70. Id.
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result of hesitancy by MLB and the MLBPA to experience another
work stoppage runs contrary to the conventional wisdom shared by
both commentators and MLB insiders at the time of the CFA's
passage.
Thus, while the CFA is not solely responsible for ushering in
MLB's current and unprecedented labor peace, the Act must neverthe-
less be credited with having helped to change the tone of negotiations
between MLB and the MLBPA-contrary to predictions at the time of
its enactment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the original skepticism surrounding the CFA, the Act has
in actuality helped to usher in MLB's longest sustained period of labor
peace in nearly forty years. While this newfound labor harmony un-
doubtedly results from more than the CFA alone, a closer examination
of the other most plausible explanations reveals that MLB's current
labor reconciliation cannot be explained simply as the result of base-
ball's current profits, nor the sport's hesitancy to experience another
damaging work stoppage. Indeed, by increasing the antitrust risk to
MLB owners for negotiating in bad faith, the CFA has helped alter the
tenor of labor negotiations between the owners and the MLBPA.
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